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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.
This case is an appeal from a grant of dismissal in favor of Defendants. This matter

was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals under UTAH CODE
ANN.

§ 78-2-2(4). Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j), this Court has appellate

jurisdiction.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW.

Issues Presented for Appeal:
Issue 1:

Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint?

Standard for Appellate Review:
The propriety of dismissal is a matter of law, reviewed under a correctness standard,
giving no deference to the trial court's determination. See Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974,
979 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Issue 2:

Did the trial court err in refusing to order consolidation?

Standard for Appellate Review:
A trial court's refusal to consolidate matters is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Hassing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 159 P.2d 117 (Utah 1945) ("'But if the actions
were such as could have been consolidated, it was within the discretion of the Court to make,
or refuse to make, the order. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the consolidation of
actions, even when permissible, cannot be demanded as a matter of right; the matter rests

i

within the discretion of the court, which will not be interfered with, unless clearly abused,
particularly where the consolidation is denied'" (emphasis in original) (quoting with
approval from St. George v. Boucher, 21A P. 489, 491 (Mont. 1929)).
III.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES.
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) is the determinative rule implicated by Yanaki's appeal. [See

Addendum Exhibit "A," which is a copy of this rule.]
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Iomed employed Yanaki from 1992 until 2002. Governing Yanaki's employment at

lomed was an agreement precluding Yanaki, during or after employment, from disclosing
Iomed's trade secrets (the "IP Agreement"). [See Record on Appeal ("R.") 2 at f 6.]
Yanaki enjoyed a successful career at Iomed, eventually becoming lomed's General
Manager. On February 9,2000, Yanaki received a promotion to General Manager, Clinical
Systems. His annual salary at that time was $150,000.00, with an annual bonus, a stock
incentive plan, educational benefits, and health benefits. [See R. 124 at ^J18.] For example,
Yanaki entered into an Education Agreement with Iomed which allowed him to obtain an
Executive MBA at the University of Utah at Iomed's expense. Under that agreement, Yanaki
promised to repay Iomed for tuition paid on his behalf if he left Iomed voluntarily, which he
did in January 2002. [See R. 124 atffif19-20.]
At the time of his voluntary resignation, Yanaki had supervisory responsibility over
the following critical areas of Iomed's commercial business operations: (1) Manufacturing,
ii

Quality Control, Design and Engineering; (2) Customer Relations, Marketing and National
Sales; (3) Product Management and Product Development; (4) Regulatory Affairs; and
(5) Reimbursement. [See R. 125 at ^f 21.] In his position, Yanaki attended executive
meetings in which he participated in regular discussions involving Iomed's most confidential
information, including business strategies, research and development plans, the status of
ongoing research, confidential communications with Iomed's intellectual property advisors,
including legal counsel, sales, marketing and financial information. Few, if any, Iomed
employees had more intimate knowledge of the company's confidential information than
Yanaki. [See R. 125 at ^ 21.]
When Yanaki chose to leave Iomed in early 2002, he took with him Iomed's trade
secrets. Rather than honoring his long-standing obligations under the IP Agreement, Yanaki
and others took an Iomed invention to Iomed's chief competitor, Empi, Inc., with an offer
to jointly develop and sell a product incorporating Iomed's confidential information. [See
R. 134-35 at ff 64-70.] Eventually, an errant e-mail sent to Yanaki's old Iomed e-mail
address revealed his scheme. [See R. 136-37 at ^ 79-80.]
Having discovered Yanaki's misconduct, Iomed filed an action on April 9,2002. [See
R. 42, Complaint.] Shortly thereafter, Iomed sought and received a Court order allowing
Iomed to seize certain Iomed documents and a computer hard drive located in Yanaki's home
office, and deposit them with the Court in order to preserve it. [See R. 31 at fn. 1.]
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In its lawsuit, Iomed sought enforcement of the IP Agreement, as well as the
Education Agreement, since Yanaki had failed to repay approximately $ 15,000.00 in tuition
owed to Iomed under the clear terms of the Education Agreement. [See R. 153-54 at ^ 16977.]
In response to Iomed's lawsuit, Yanaki brought a counterclaim against Iomed for
refusing to allow him to compete as allowed under the IP Agreement. [See R. 113-14 at ff 1 7.] He also sued Iomed's CEO, Robert Lollini, and its Director of Human Resources, Mary
Crowther, for defamation. [See R. 115 atfflf9-11.] Yanaki subsequently filed several other
lawsuits to pressure Iomed to settle the Original Litigation. Among those lawsuits were two
federal complaints alleging that Iomed, Lollini, Crowther, and Iomed's legal counsel had
violated the civil rights of Yanaki and his fiancee in preserving the evidence in Yanaki's
home office. [See R. 31 at fn. 1.]
The case now before this Court represents the latest front in Yanaki's campaign of
litigation against Iomed, its officers, and its legal counsel. Yanaki now alleges that by
seeking to enforce the IP Agreement in order to protect its trade secrets and seeking recovery
under the Education Agreement, Iomed somehow has discriminated against Yanaki. [See
R. 7 at If 26.]
Because Yanaki's discrimination claims arise out of the same transactions and
occurrences underlying the original litigation, Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure compelled Yanaki to bring such claims, if at all, as part of his counterclaim
iv

against Iomed, Lollini, and Crowther in the original litigation. In particular, Yanaki cannot
escape the fact that both the Original Litigation and this case focus largely on Iomed's
attempts to enforce the IP Agreement and Education Agreement.
Recognizing that this litigation is inextricably intertwined with the Original Litigation,
the trial court correctly granted Iomed's motion to dismiss this litigation under Rule 13(a).
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

On April 9, 2002, Iomed filed a lawsuit against Jamal Yanaki alleging, inter

alia, that Yanaki breached an Intellectual Property and Invention Agreement (the "IP
Agreement") by successfully shopping Iomed's trade secrets to its chief competitor, Empi.
("Original Litigation") [R. 42-84.] Iomed also alleges that Yanaki breached an Education
Agreement between the parties by refusing to repay over $15,000.00 in tuition advanced on
his behalf by Iomed upon his voluntary termination of employment. [See R. 50-51 at f^f 99107.] On December 6, 2002, Iomed filed its First Amended Complaint against Yanaki and
others. [SeeR. 119-63.]
2.

On September 9, 2002, Yanaki filed charges of discrimination against Iomed

with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division and the Equal Opportunity
Commission. UALD No. A2-0836 and EEOC No. 35C-A2-0836. [R. 7 at 127.]
3.

On January 10, 2003, Yanaki filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the First

Amended Complaint in the Original Litigation ("Answer and Counterclaim"). [See R. 86117.] In his counterclaim, Yanaki claims that Iomed breached the IP Agreement by failing
v

to allow him to compete with lomed. [See R. 113-14 at f 1-7.] Not only did Yanaki sue
lomed, Yanaki also sued lomed's CEO, Robert Lollini, and lomed's Human Resources
Director, Mary Crowther, for $5 million under a defamation theory. [R. 115 at f^f 9-11.]
Thus, in the Original Litigation, lomed, Yanaki, Crowther, and Lollini are all parties. [R.
86.]
4.

On March 26, 2003, the EEOC completed its investigation of Yanaki's

discrimination claims, and found that "the information in the file does not indicate that any
further investigation of your case would necessarily result in any finding of discrimination,"
and issued Yanaki his right to sue letter. [See R. 15.]
5.

On April 14,2003, Yanaki and his fiancee filed two more lawsuits, seeking $ 15

million from against lomed, Lollini, Crowther, and lomed's legal counsel, this time alleging
that a Court-approved seizure of incriminating evidence from Yanaki's home office violated
the civil rights of Yanaki and his fiancee. [See R. 31 at fn. 1.] Judge Dee Benson dismissed
that action, and Yanaki also has appealed that ruling.
6.

On June 24,2003, Yanaki filed this lawsuit, alleging that lomed failed to allow

him to compete under the IP Agreement. [See R. 1-15.] His allegations in this regard are
nearly identical to those set forth in his Answer and Counterclaim. [Compare R. 1-15 with
R. 86-117.]
7.

In this lawsuit, just as in the Original Litigation, Yanaki also addresses the

Education Agreement, claiming that it does not require him to repay tuition advanced by
vi

lomed, and that lomed's demand for repayment in the Original Litigation violates his civil
rights under U.S.C. § 1981 and constitutes retaliatory discrimination in violation of Title VII
and UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106. [See R. 3, 8-10 atfflj9, 34, 39, and 42.]
8.

In the Original Litigation, lomed claims that Yanaki was a key, senior lomed

employee who was well-compensated, but chose to voluntarily leave lomed and unfairly
compete against lomed by using lomed's proprietary confidential information, including
vendor lists, customer lists, pricing information, and information about a developmental
product at lomed which Yanaki oversaw in his capacity of General Manager. [See R. 124-25
at Tflf 19-21.] lomed further alleges that Yanaki carefully prepared for his departure by
deleting incriminating e-mails, taking key files over a weekend shortly before he left lomed,
and lying to lomed about his post-employment intentions. [See R. 134-35 at ff 64-70.]
9.

In this lawsuit, Yanaki alleges that the mere filing of the Original Litigation

constitutes ongoing retaliatory discrimination in violation of Title VII and UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34A-5-106. [See R. 7, 9-10 at ffi[ 26, 39, 42.] Yet Yanaki admits that he left lomed
voluntarily to pursue consulting opportunities with two other Defendants in the Original
Litigation, JRW Technologies and Ceramatec, Inc. [See R. 5 at ^ 16-17.]
10.

As is readily apparent from a review of the Complaint in the Original Litigation

and the Complaint filed herein, there is nearly complete factual overlap between the claims
brought by lomed in the Original Litigation and the claims raised by Yanaki in this, his latest
lawsuit. [Compare R. 7-8 atffi[26-28 and 34 with R. 113-14 at ffil 1-7.] Because of the
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substantial factual overlap, Iomed moved to dismiss this action under Utah R. Civ. P., 13(a),
arguing that such claims should have been brought as compulsory counterclaims in the
Original Litigation. [See R. 26-28.]
11.

The trial court granted Iomed's motion, concluding that there was substantial

factual overlap between the two matters and that this action and the original litigation were
inextricably intertwined. [See R. 234-35, Minute Entry, a copy of which is attached to the
Addendum as Exhibit "B".] The court also based its ruling on the concern that permitting
parallel litigation of similar legal and factual issues would increase the risk of inconsistent
judicial findings. [See R. 234, Addendum, Exhibit "B".]
VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rules 13(a) and 13(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure divide counterclaims into

two basic categories — compulsory and permissive. A counterclaim is designated as either
compulsory or permissive based on its relationship to the opposing party's claim.
Accordingly, a counterclaim that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim" falls under Rule 13(a) and is compulsory. On
the other hand, if the claim does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim, that claim is not a compulsory counterclaim, but
may be brought permissively under Rule 13(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 13.
If a counterclaim is deemed compulsory, then failure by a party to assert it in an
answer forever bars that claim from being brought in separate litigation. See Slim Olson, Inc.
viii

v. Winegar, 246 P.2d 608 (Utah 1952) (failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim precludes
the party from asserting it in a subsequent action); Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P.2d 839 (Utah
1955) (a counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter involving the same transaction
addressed by the original plaintiffs complaint is forever barred); see also Raile Family Trust
v. PromaxDiv., Corp., 24R3d980 983 (Utah2001) (same); Fox v. Maulding, 112 F.3d453,
457 (10th Cir. 1997) (same).
In the case now before this Court, the claims brought by Yanaki arise out of the same
transactions or occurrences at issue in the Original Litigation. Indeed, Iomed's alleged
breaches of two of the critical agreements at issue in the Original Litigation - the IP
Agreement and the Education Agreement - as well as initiation of the Original Litigation
itself form the fundamental factual bases for Yanaki's claims here. Consequently, the trial
court properly dismissed Yanaki's claims in this matter because they should have been
brought in the Original Litigation.
Yanaki argues that the trial court should not have dismissed at least his Title VII
claims because those claims had not matured at the time he filed his Answer and
Counterclaim on January 10, 2003. However, under established case law, Yanaki should
have asserted his Title VII claims in the Original Litigation and either requested a stay or
leave to amend. See Wilkes v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, 314 F.3d 501 (10th Cir.
2002).

ix

Yanaki also contends that his discrimination claims against lomed's CEO, Robert
Lollini, and lomed's Human Resource Director, Mary Crowther, are not subject to Rule
13(a)'s compulsory counterclaim requirement because they were not plaintiffs in the Original
Litigation. Yanaki is simply wrong as a matter of law.
Rule 13(a) mandates that all claims any party has against any other party relating to
the same transactions or occurrences must be brought in one action. Here, Yanaki brought
claims against Lollini and Crowther in the Original Litigation. These claims related to things
Lollini and Crowther purportedly said about Yanaki relating to his employment at Iomed.
If Yanaki also had discrimination claims against Lollini and Crowther arising from Yanaki's
employment with Iomed, he had to bring them at the same time. See AMP Inc. v. Zacharias,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 (N.D. 111. 1987).
In the event this Court disagrees with the trial court's dismissal of Yanaki's claims,
the Court should nevertheless uphold the dismissal under Utah's judicial proceedings
privilege. This privilege protects all conduct involved in seeking to enforce rights through
litigation.

Here, all of Yanaki's claims hinge upon lomed's decision to enforce its

contractual rights by litigating against Yanaki for stealing and then peddling lomed's trade
secrets to its primary competitor, Empi, Inc. Because lomed's conduct is protected by the
judicial proceedings privilege, Yanaki's claims must fail as a matter of law in any event.

VII.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT YANAKFS
CLAIMS WERE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS THAT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN RAISED IN THE ORIGINAL LITIGATION.
1.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THIS
LAWSUIT AND THE ORIGINAL LITIGATION ARISE
LARGELY UNDER THE SAME SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS
AND OCCURRENCES.

The best way for this Court to analyze whether the Original Litigation and this action
arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences is to compare the allegations of
three operative documents: (1) Iomed's First Amended Complaint in the Original Litigation;
(2) Yanaki's Answer and Counterclaim in the Original Litigation; and (3) Yanaki's
Complaint in this case. A review of those three pleadings demonstrates that the key
documents in each case are the IP Agreement and the Education Agreement. [Compare
R. 119-162 with R. 86-116 and with R. 1 -11.] Moreover, the critical facts at issue in all three
pleadings are the circumstances occurring before, during and subsequent to Yanaki's
voluntary departure from Iomed.
Courts have repeatedly found in situations similar to the one facing this Court that all
claims relating to an employment relationship should be litigated in one action. For example,
in Klein v. London Star Ltd., 26 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D.N. Y. 1998), the court found that claims
of employment discrimination by the employee were so intertwined with the employer's
counterclaim alleging theft of trade secrets that the claims must be tried together.
Specifically, the court held as follows:
1

Klein claims that he was constructively discharged because of alleged age
discrimination. Defendants' answer provides an alternative basis for why
Klein left Star Group's employ—i.e., that Klein left because he knew he would
be discharged for his theft of Star Group's trade secrets. The counterclaim
against Klein is based on the same transaction and occurrence that is the
subject matter of this action as it arises out of Klein's employment with
defendants and the constructive discharge from his employment Any
discovery concerning Klein's performance while employed with defendants is
relevant to this claim and Klein will not be prejudiced by burdensome
discovery outside the scope of the initial claims and counterclaims asserted in
this action.
Klein, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (emphasis added).1
Numerous other courts agree with this reasoning. For example, in a case involving
an agreement very similar to the Education Agreement, the court in Baroody v. Bankair, Inc.,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 970 (January 21, 2003), found a counterclaim brought by the
employer in response to a discrimination claim by the employee to be compulsory.
Specifically, the employer sought to enforce the terms of a contract requiring the employee
to repay a loan to the employer upon termination. The employee had argued that because of
the discrimination, he did not have to repay the loan. See Baroody, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2003, *4. Similar arguments have been raised in this proceeding and the proceeding before
Judge Medley.

1

In his Brief, Yanaki cites to a single case in which it was found that an employer's
counterclaim for theft of trade secrets was not compulsory in an action by the employee for
discrimination. [See Appellant's Brief at pg. 16.] However, in that case the employer
expressly admitted that its counterclaim was entirely unrelated to plaintiffs claims. As a
result of that concession, the court found that the employer's counterclaims were not
compulsory. See Spencer v. Banco Real S.A., 623 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
There is no such concession here.
2

Likewise, in Keith A. Keisser Insurance Agency v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, 2046 F. Supp. 2d 833 (N.D. Ohio 2003), the court considered a motion to dismiss
very similar to the one brought by Iomed. In analyzing whether claims by the former
insurance agent against his insurance agency should have been raised as compulsory
counterclaims in the original action, the court looked at whether the claims arose from the
same transaction or occurrence. Id, at 835.
In making its ruling, the court cited with approval the following authority: "Multiple
claims are compulsory counterclaims where they 'involve many of the same factual issues,
or the same factual legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties.' Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631,634."
The court then held as follows:
I conclude the plaintiffs claims in this case are logically related to the
defendant's claims in the state court action. They all arise from the parties'
former relationship as principal and agent. At the core of both sets of claims
is the contention that the other party breached one or more of their contractual
obligations to the other. The individual claims, whether state or federal,
contract or tort, common law or statutory, arise from that relationship and
share that common core. Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary and their
attempt to break the nexus between their claims and defendant's claims in the
state court action are not persuasive.
Id.

Just as in the Keisser matter, here Yanaki attempts to bring statutory claims

independently of a large ongoing litigation matter in which nearly the entire employment
relationship between Yanaki and Iomed is at issue, and in which the dispositive agreements
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between the parties, the IP Agreement and the Education Agreement, form the fundamental
bases for each parties' claims against the other in each of the two separate legal proceedings.
In commenting on the public policy reasons for not allowing the plaintiff in that
matter to do what Yanaki seeks to do here, the court in Keisser made the following comment:
In addition . . . the need to avoid inconsistent adjudications [and]
considerations of judicial economy would lead to the same conclusion. Each
suit involves construction of the corporate agency agreement and other
contractual understandings between the parties. Whenever two courts look at
the same contract, differing interpretations are possible, even if not likely.
Even if both courts read the contract in the same way, one of them will have
spent its time doing so unnecessarily. This is the sort of exercise that the
compulsory counterclaim rule seeks to avoid, just as it also seeks to prevent
inconsistent outcomes.
Id. at 836. The court also noted that "[c]laims have also been deemed to be compulsory
where, as here, they arise from the parties' former occupational relationship. Thus, in
Morgan Adhesives Inc. v. Datchuk, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 8, 2001 WL 73 83, *2 (Ohio
App.), the court held that a former employee's claims for handicap discrimination and
retaliation were compulsory counterclaims in his former employer's suit for fraud and
falsification." Id.
It would be patently unfair for Yanaki to be allowed to litigate nearly identical claims
based on identical facts with the apparent hope that he may prevail in one of the two forums.
In particular, it would be unfair to force Iomed to continue to expend additional resources
to defend Yanaki's claims about the IP Agreement and the Education Agreement in the

4

counterclaim in the Original Litigation as well as in this matter, which is really the identical
claim dressed up in the guise of a discrimination claim.
2.

IOMED DID NOT WAIVE ITS
COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE UALD AND EEOC.

Yanaki argues that Defendants cannot move to dismiss this Complaint because Iomed
did not raise the compulsory counterclaim argument in earlier proceedings before the UALD
ortheEEOC. Defendants' assertion of a Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim defense would
not have been relevant or appropriate to bring in the UALD or EEOC proceedings. Iomed's
responses to the UALD and EEOC claims focused, as they should have, on the factual
allegations of Yanaki's claims, not the procedural requirements of a subsequent court action.
Consequently, Iomed cannot be found to have somehow waived its right to bring a
motion to dismiss under Rule 13(a).
3.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED YANAKTS
TITLE VII CLAIMS.

Yanaki argues that his Title VII claim cannot be included in the compulsory
counterclaim requirement because it was not a mature claim at the time Iomed initiated the
Original Litigation. While Yanaki is correct that he was required to receive the right to sue
letter before he could pursue his claim in court, he should have asserted a "placeholder"
claim in the Original Litigation.
The case of Wilkes v. Wyoming Dep 't of Employment, 314 F.3d 501 (10th Cir. 2002)
provides helpful precedent in this regard. In Wilkes, plaintiff filed suit against her former
5

employer for equal pay under section 206(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That claim
was resolved though an offer ofjudgment. She later filed a second lawsuit based on gender
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The employer moved for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that the facts giving rise to both the first and second claims for relief were
properly defined as the employment relationship, and that the Title VII claims should have
been brought, if at all, in the prior lawsuit. Plaintiff argued, just as Yanaki does here, that
her Title VII claims could not have been brought in the first action because she had not
received her right to sue letter from the EEOC at the time she filed the first lawsuit.
Rejecting this argument, the trial court found that plaintiff should have brought the Title VII
claim in the first action and requested a stay until exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Wilkes, 314 F.3d at 505. The appellate court agreed, affirming that the Title VII claims were
barred because they had not been raised in the prior action.
Further, there is no doubt that Yanaki was aware of the facts giving rise to potential
claims of discrimination long before he filed his Answer and Counterclaim on January 10,
2003. Indeed, some four months earlier, Yanaki had brought allegations of discrimination
to the UALD and the EEOC.
Where a litigant is aware of such facts, the compulsory counterclaim rule bars
subsequent litigation based on such facts. For example, in Crutcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 746
F.2d 1076, 1080 (5th Cir. 1984), the appellate court ruled as follows:
The district judge held the facts which formed the basis of Crutcher's tort claim
rendered it a compulsory counterclaim that Crutcher was required to raise in the
6

earlier guarantee lawsuit with Aetna (first case) since the facts were known to him at
that time. As a result, the district court dismissed the claim as barred under Rule
13(a). We agree. Failure to bring a compulsory tort counterclaim in an action on the
contract will bar a later independent action on the tort. Cleckner v. Republic Van and
Storage Co., 556 F.2d 766 (5th Cir.1977).
Moreover, the trial court in this matter dismissed Yanaki's claims without prejudice,
allowing Yanaki to seek leave to amend his counterclaim in the Original Litigation. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d) ("A claim which . . . matured after serving his pleading may, with the
permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.").
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED CLAIMS AGAINST
LOLLINI AND CROWTHER.

Yanaki incorrectly argues that his claims against Iomed's CEO, Robert Lollini, and
its Human Resources Director, Mary Crowther, should not have been dismissed because
Lollini and Crowther were not plaintiffs in the Original Litigation. This argument fails as
a matter of law.
Rule 13(a) requires that all claims between and among parties in litigation arising out
of the same transactions or occurrences be brought in one action. Yanaki himself brought
claims in the Original Litigation against Lollini and Crowther for defamation arising out of
Yanaki's employment with Iomed. [See R. 113-15.] Here, Yanaki brings claims against
Lollini and Crowther for discrimination, also arising out of Yanaki's employment with
Iomed. In such circumstances, it is proper to dismiss this action because his discrimination
claims against Iomed, Lollini, and Crowther had to be brought in the Original Litigation.
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A similar situation arose in AMP Inc. v. Zacharias, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 (N.D.
111. 1987) (applying Federal Rule 13(a)). Like this case, AMP involved a dispute over
conduct surrounding trade secrets. There, Precision sued AMP in Florida. Later, AMP sued
Precision in Illinois, and also sued certain corporate officers of Precision and another entity.
Precision moved to dismiss the Illinois action under Rule 13(a), contending that AMP should
have brought the claims against the individuals in the Florida action. In response, AMP
argued that Rule 13(a) was not applicable to claims against the individual defendants because
they were not parties to the Florida action. The Court disagreed, ruling that:
Rule 13(a) contemplates that a compulsory counterclaim might contain issues not in
the original action and might involve additional parties.... Further, Rule 13(a) is not
limited in its application to original parties, but is applicable to parties brought
in subsequent to the filing of the original action. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, §
13.02 (1985). In fact, subdivision 13(h) contemplates the situation where additional
parties are required for the granting of complete relief in determination of the
counterclaim (A sues X and Y, X counterclaims against A and B and C). In the
instant case, AMP has brought an action against Precision, a plaintiff in the Tampa
suit, and against four additional defendants, each of whom is an officer or key
employee of the corporate plaintiffs in the Tampa case.
The paramount concern under Rule 13(a) is judicial economy. The Court
should not apply Rule 13(a) woodenly, but should interpret it liberally so as to allow
the joinder of all related claims.
AMP, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 at *7-*8.
Under the same analysis, and for the same policy reasons, this Court should not
reverse the trial court's determination that all claims, including claims against Lollini and
Crowther, should have been brought in the Original Litigation.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ORDER CONSOLIDATION.

Yanaki contends that the trial court should have consolidated the two cases rather than
dismissing this action. The trial court's refusal to consolidate is granted substantially more
deference than its ruling to dismiss. Hassing v. Mutual Life Ins, Co., 159 P.2d 117 (Utah
1945). Here, the trial court decided to dismiss Yanaki's claims without prejudice, giving
Yanaki the opportunity to attempt to replead the claims in the Original Litigation, where they
should have been brought, if at all. Yanaki correctly points out that the court in the Original
Litigation could choose not to allow amendment of the Answer and Counterclaim, because
the deadline for amending pleadings is long past. However, were it otherwise, a litigant
could always seek to evade such deadlines in litigation by filing claims in a subsequent
lawsuit which should have been brought in earlier litigation.
In addition, courts have long ruled that where a claim is dismissed under Rule 13(a),
an alternative request for consolidation is rendered moot in any event. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Petzold, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24920 (M.D. N.C. 2001).
D.

THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE DISMISSED THE ACTION
UNDER THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE.

In the proceedings below, Iomed also argued that Yanaki' s claims should be dismissed
because they rested largely on Iomed's decision to litigate against Yanaki for breaching the
IP Agreement and the Education Agreement. Even if this Court were to find that the claim
was not properly dismissed under Rule 13(a), the Court could uphold the dismissal based on
9

Utah's recognized judicial proceedings privilege. Judgment in Iomed's favor may be
affirmed:
If it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent from the record, even
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis
of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was considered
or passed on by the lower court.

Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Tf 18); see also
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 23 n.8 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court need
not confine itself to affirming the trial court on the basis of the argument relied upon below.
Each of Yanaki's three claims for relief rests on the premise that Iomed discriminated
against him by pursuing legal action for misappropriation of Iomed's trade secrets. However,
Iomed cannot be found to have discriminated merely because it seeks to enforce its legal
rights under contracts with Yanaki. Such conduct is protected by the judicial proceedings
privilege. See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003).
Following the trial court's minute entry, Yanaki's counsel sought to include in the
final Order a holding rejecting Iomed's claim of protection under the judicial proceedings
privilege. [See R. 248-50.] The trial court rejected this proposed amendment. [See R. 24041.]
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VIII. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision to dismiss this action should be
upheld.
DATED this

I*

day of January, 2005.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Clark Waddoups
Jonathan O. Hafen
Justin P. Matkin

By:
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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charges of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by
failing to plead it in answer to defendant's
counterclaim. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13
Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962).
The statute of limitations defense must be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived, unless an
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v.
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102
(Utah 1998).
—Waiver.
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract
to purchase a business from defendant on
ground that the agreement was procured by
fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud
had been waived by plaintiffs continued operation of the business, the allegation of waiver
was an affirmative defense which should have
been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a
waiver of the defense under this rule. Bezner v.
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898
(Utah 1976).
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Tbwn of
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d
57,305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable life

Rule 13

Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d 924
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah
1980); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah
1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah
1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612
(Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Const*. Co. V.Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
754 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow Iiidtis., Inc. v,
Zions First Natl Bank, 767 P.2d 935 .(Utah
1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d
668 (Utah 1989); Weber v. Snyderville West,
800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied,
815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. W l e y
Mtg. Co., 835 P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v.
Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v.
Middlekauff lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d
1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek
Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley
Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 R2d
361 (Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, granted,
982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999); Busche v. Salt Lake
County, 2001 UT App 111, 26 P.3d 862; United
States v. Smith, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. Utah
2002); IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., 2003
UT 5, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 73 R3d 320.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur.SkL — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 46 et
seq., 86; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237,
280, 389 et seq.
OJ.S- — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136,
138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116,121 to 129,264 to 268,
424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to 586.
A.L.R.—Right to voluntary dismissal of civil
action as affected by opponent's motion for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.

What, other than affidavits, constitutes ''matters outside the pleadings," which may convert
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedyre
12(b), (c) into motion for summary judgment, 2
A.L.R. Fed. 1027.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or
13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Necessity of oral argument on motion for
summary judgment on pleadings in federal
court, 105 AX.R. Fed. 755.

Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims, A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon his cl^im by attachment or other
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim ahy
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or-occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.

Rule 13
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(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading
of the opposing party
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with
the, permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading,
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross^claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction
of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross demands
have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, the
two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and
neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the
other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
dounterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an
assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment deleted former Subdivision (k), providing
for disposition of a counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim in excess of the court's jurisdi< ion
£ * ., . „,
~ , ,
, , ^x
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (h)
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 13,

Cross-References. — Holder in due course,
§§ 70A-3-305, 70A-3-602.
Rights of one not holder in due course, § 70A3-306.
Security interests, assignment, § 70A-9a-403
e j. se<1

FRAP.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Claims against assignee.
—Contractual alteration of rights.
Compulsory counterclaim.
—Failure to plead.
—Not in smitl claims court.
—Not proper.
—Opposing party's claim.
—Party not in interest.
—Proper.
—Purpose.

—Requirements.
Cross-claim.
— Offset.
Promissory notes,
—Prerequisite,
Prior judgment,
—Timeliness.
—Under Liability Reform Act.
Jurisdiction.
—Appellate.
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—Federal.
Omitted counterclaim.
—Newly discovered.
Permissive counterclaim.
—Dismissal of related pending action.
Separate judgments.
—Effect of remand.
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim.
Cited.
Claims against assignee.
—Contractual alteration of rights.
Subdivision (j) does not abrogate the rights of
parties to contract freely with respect to their
rights and remedies upon assignment.
Lundstrom v. RCA, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P2d
339 (1965).
Compulsory counterclaim.
—Failure to plead.
Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim
precludes the party from asserting it in a subsequent action. Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122
Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952).
A counterclaim not presented to the court on
a matter involving the same transaction addressed by the plaintiff's complaint is forever
barred. Tbdaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285
R2d 839 (1955).
Where defendant's counterclaim was compulsory because it arose out of the transaction that
was the subject matter of plaintiffs claim, his
failure to file a counterclaim resulted in a
waiver of the claim. Kimball v. Campbell, 699
P.2d 714 (Utah 1985).
Plaintiffs, who had been defendants in an
earlier related action, had the obligation under
Subdivision (a) to raise any available counterclaims arising out of the same transaction, and
because they failed to raise available counterclaims as defendants, they waived the right to
raise those same claims in a separate action.
Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001
UT 40, 24 P3d 980.
Parties could not evade the dictates of Subdivision (a) by arguing that they had acted as
individuals in the prior related action, but as
trustees in the case at bar, after they had
asserted affirmative defenses on behalf of the
trust in the prior action rather than moving for
dismissal for failure to join an indispensable
party. Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp.,
2001 UT 40, 24 P.3d 980.
—Not in small claims court.
Within the limited jurisdiction of the small
claims court, a defendant is not compelled to
bring a counterclaim though it may arise from
the same transaction or occurrence as the subject matter sued on Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d
1372 (Utah 1986).
—Not proper.
In action by government to condemn parcel of
land, counterclaim by part owner of parcel for
damage to adjoining parcel as result of condemnation of first parcel was not compulsory under
Subdivision (a) and could be pleaded as an
amendment to owner's original answer under
Subdivision (e). State ex rel. Eng,g Comm'n v.
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Bird & Evans, Inc, 1 Utah 2d 276,265 P.2d 639
(1953).
—Opposing party's claim.
The opposing party's claim mentioned in
Subdivision (a) refers only to the claim of the
opposing party against the party who has the
counterclaim, not a claim that the opposing
party has against a third person. State ex rel.
Eng^g Comm'n v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 1 Utah 2d
276, 265 P.2d 639 (1953).
—Party not in interest.
If named defendants belieye that they are not
the correct parties in interest and therefore
cannot raise counterclaims, they must defend
on that ground and place all parties and the
court on notice of that defense. Raile Family
Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40,24 P.3d
980.
—Proper.
Portion of open account consisting of charges
for parts used in installing oil sump constituted
a compulsory counterclaim in debtor's negligence claim against creditor for injuries resulting from faulty installation of oil sump, and
could not be obtained in subsequent action by
creditor. Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122 Utah
80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952).
—Purpose.
The purpose of Rule 13(a) is to ensure that all
relevant claims arising out of a given transaction are litigated in the same action. Raile
Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40,
24 P.3d 980,
—Requirements.
A counterclaim that requires a certain adjudication of the plaintiffs main claim for accrual
is not a proper counterclaim; a counterclaim
that requires proof of a fact, which fact is also a
necessary part of the plaintiff's main claim, is a
proper counterclaim. Salt Lake City v. Utah
Lake Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14,286 P.2d 773
(1955).
Cross-claim.
—Offset.
Promissory notes.
A claimant on promissory note is entitled to
an offset from the amount claimed by a crossclaimant against her on another note, even if
the statute of limitations has expired as to
claims on the entire amount due under the
notes. Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah
1985).
—Prerequisite.
Prior judgment.
Under Subdivision (f), it is no longer necessary that the liability sued upon in the crossclaim must first have become fixed by a judgment as at common law. Stanley Title Co. v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 26 Utah 2d 121,
485 P.2d 1400 (1971).
—Timeliness.
The cross-claim, to the extent that it sought
contribution for sums the insurance company
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paid in defending the plaintiff, related back to
the date of the filing of the original complaint
and was therefore timely filed. Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Cas, & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127
(Utah 1997).
—Under Liability Reform Act.
The effect of the Liability Reform Act in
prohibiting contribution claims requires joint
tortfeasor codefendants to raise cross-claims
against each other in the underlying tort action
or else such claims may be lost, and, even
though this conflicts with Subdivision (f), the
Act controls for the purpose of preserving substantive rights thereunder. National Serv.
Indus., Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 937 P.2d
551 (Utah C t App. 1997), cert, granted, 945
P.2d I l i a (Utah 1997).
. The state liability reform act, §§ 78-27-37 to
78-27-43, prohibits an apportionment claim
from being brought outside the underlying tort
action, and the apportionment claim must
therefore be brought as a cross-claim in the
underlying suit if it is not to be lost. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Carpet
Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Utah 1998).
Jurisdiction.
—Appellate.
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.R 54(b), applies when the trial court orders a separate
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, and failure to have the case
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
issues and parties before that court, will deprive the appellate court ofjurisdiction over an
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 R2d 298
(Utah 1991).
—Federal.
Trial court, in a stockbroker's action against
its customer for damages resulting from the
customer's failure to deliver a stock certificate,
has no jurisdiction to hear the customer's counterclaim alleging violations of federal securities
statutes and rules, all of which came under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Western Capital
& Sec., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 R2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989).
Omitted counterclaim.
—Newly discovered.
In personal injury action in which defendant's insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend
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insured and lawyer had not met defendant
until just before taking his deposition and
therefore did not know that defendant had
injuries and believed plaintiff to have been at
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to
include counterclaim was an abuse of discretion
since case was one where justice requires''
amendihent. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d
165* 486 P.2d 1045 (1971).
Permissive counterclaim.
—Dismissal of related pending action.
Where mortgagee brought action to foreclose
on one of two mortgages and mortgagor at that
time had an action pending against the mortgagee concerning the same mortgages, it was
within the court's discretion to dismiss the
mortgagor's action since the mortgagor could
raise any claim he had against the mortgagee
by counterclaim in the foreclosure suit.
Blomquist v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 17
Utah 2d 381, 412 P2d 914 (1966).
Separate judgments.
—Effect of remand.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and counterclaim would be
subject, on remand, to revision since all claims
presented had not been adjudicated and since
trial court made no express determination as
required by Rule 54(b). M & S Constr. & Eng'g
Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139,
467 P.2d 410 (1970).
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying motions to allow a counterclaim and to
bring in third party defendants which were
filed 13 months after an answer to the complaint was filed and two weeks before the
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the
untimely motion were inadequate and where
the parties failed to demonstrate that the
court's denial of the motions resulted in prejudice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Cited in Lincoln Fin. Corp. v. Perrier, 567
R2d 1102 (Utah 1977); Hood v. Layton, 751 P.2d
1141 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Parkdale Care Ctr.
v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 1 et seq.; 20
Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 120; 59 Am. Jur. 2d
Parties § 188 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 182 to 186.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 66; 50 C.J.S.
Judgments § 684; 67A C.J.S. Parties §§ 88 to
110; 71 C.J.S Pleading §§ 167 to 176; 80 C.J.S.
Setoff and Counterclaim §§ 1 et seq., 13,27,36,
54.
AJL.R. — Bank's right to apply or set off
deposit against debt of depositor not due at

time of his death, 7 AL.R.3d 908.
Proceeding for summary judgment as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A.L.R.3d 1361.
Presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as counterclaim or setoff, 36 A.L.R.3d 693.
Right of party-litigant to defend or counterclaim on ground that opposing party or his
attorney is engaged in unauthorized practice of
law, 7 A.L.R.4th 1146.
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim
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for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in
same proceeding in which abuse occurred —
state cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115.
Who is an "opposing party" against whom a
counterclaim can be filed under Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 13(a) or (b), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 815.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or

Rule 14

13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Effect of filing as separate federal action
daim that would be compulsory counterclaim
m pending federal action, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 240.

Rule 14. Third-party practice.
(a) When defendant may bring in third party. At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him.
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files
the third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his original
answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to
the action. The person served with the summons and third-party complaint,
hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the
third-party plaintifFs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party
defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert
against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the
plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against
the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintifFs claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the
third-party defendant.
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. When a counterclaim is asserted
against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 14(a) and (b), F.R.C.R
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMAL YANAKI,
Plaintiffs,
MINUTE ENTRY
vs.

Case No. 030914206
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK

IOMED, INC., a Utah
corporation, ROBERT J. LOLLINI
and MARY CROWTHER,

January 5, 2004

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument
with respect to the motion on December 5, 2004. Following the
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
After reviewing the pleadings submitted in this matter, it
is clear the current action arises largely from the same series
of transactions and occurrences as those underlying Iomed's
original lawsuit against Yanaki and others (specifically, the IP
Agreement and Education Agreement). Moreover, although not
mirror images of each, the claims all center around the former
occupational relationship.
Based upon the forgoing, the Court is persuaded the causes
of action are so intertwined that the risk of inconsistent
rulings is present if this action is allowed to proceed in its
present form. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted with
certain limitations. Specifically, dismissal is without
prejudice and under the circumstances, the Court is not persuaded
fees are appropriate. Consequently, this request is denied.

DATED th i s _ ^ ay of January, 2004
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